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CARLOS M . VÁZQUEZ
Withdrawing from International Custom: Terrible 
Food, Small Portions
Curtis A. Bradley and Mitu Gulati’s Withdrawing from International Custom
brings to mind the old joke recounted by Woody Allen in Annie Hall: “Two 
elderly women are at a Catskill mountain resort, and one of ’em says, ‘Boy, the 
food at this place is really terrible.’ The other one says, ‘Yeah, I know; and such 
small portions.’”1 Similarly, while Bradley and Gulati attack international law’s 
current prohibition of unilateral withdrawal from custom, they propose an 
alternative that differs only modestly from it (small portions). At the same 
time, the doctrinal change they propose would take customary international 
law in the wrong direction, diminishing its value to states as a mechanism to 
address common problems (terrible food). If the goal is, as the authors say, to 
strengthen rather than bury customary international law,2 the authors have 
come up with the wrong recipe.
Under the prevailing approach to withdrawal from custom, which the 
authors denominate the “Mandatory View,” states may exempt themselves 
from a rule of customary international law by persistently objecting to the rule 
while it is in the process of forming. Once the rule has come into being, 
however, states that have not persistently objected are bound until the rule 
dissolves through a multilateral process. Bradley and Gulati propose to replace 
the Mandatory View with the “Default View,” which would recognize a limited 
right of states to withdraw unilaterally from some rules of customary 
international law.
1. ANNIE HALL (Rollins Joffe Productions 1977).
2. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 
208 (2010).
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Part I of this Essay considers how the Mandatory View actually differs from 
the authors’ proposed Default View. Section I.A examines the limitations of the 
Default View: some that Bradley and Gulati accept, some that they are willing 
to entertain and seem necessary, and some that they do not address but seem 
implicit in their proposal. Section I.B considers some aspects of the Mandatory 
View, as it actually operates, that render it less unlike the Default View than the 
authors suggest. Part I concludes that, taking account of the limitations of the 
Default View and the aspects of the Mandatory View discussed below, the 
doctrinal change the authors propose is less dramatic than they suggest.
Part II offers two reasons for believing that the modest doctrinal change 
that Bradley and Gulati propose would significantly diminish the value of 
customary international law as a mechanism for regulating state behavior.
First, adoption of the Default View would weaken customary international law 
by increasing its indeterminacy and complexity. Because customary 
international law is unwritten and lacks a centralized mechanism of 
enforcement and dispute resolution, it depends to a significant degree on the 
clarity and simplicity of its rules for its efficacy. Customary international law 
already fares poorly in this respect, but the Default View would make a bad 
situation worse by making the applicability of its rules subject to indeterminate 
limitations and qualifications. If exercised, moreover, the right to unilateral 
withdrawal would produce an extremely complex web of relationships among 
the nations of the world. This added indeterminacy and complexity would 
weaken the norms’ pull toward compliance and in turn reduce the norms’ value 
to states.
Second, the Default View would reduce any given state’s incentive to 
comply with norms of customary international law by introducing uncertainty 
about how long other states will be bound by the norm. Acceptance of a norm 
of customary international law has value to states as a form of precommitment. 
Adding an option of unilateral withdrawal reduces the value of the norm to 
states by weakening the level of other states’ commitment. A state that 
acquiesces in a new norm of customary international law agrees to subordinate 
its own short-term interest in deviating from the norm because it believes it 
will benefit over the long term if other states do the same. Each state’s 
compliance is thus an investment that it expects to pay off over the long term. 
Giving states the option of unilateral withdrawal would reduce the expected 
long-term payoff, which in turn would make states less likely to make the 
investment in the first place. Thus, under the Default View, new norms of 
customary international law are less likely to get off the ground.
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Bradley and Gulati express the hope that their proposal will prompt useful 
reflection about this particular feature of modern customary international law.3
They have clearly achieved this goal, but, for this reader, reflection has 
confirmed the wisdom of the prevailing view.
i . small portions
The proposed Default View differs less from the Mandatory View, as it 
actually operates, than Bradley and Gulati suggest. The authors recognize that 
the Default View must be subject to certain restrictions of both a procedural 
and substantive nature, and additional limitations seem implicit in their 
defense of the proposal. At the same time, the Mandatory View is less 
mandatory than the authors suggest.
A. Limitations of the Default View
Current international law regards states as formally bound by all customary 
international law rules unless they persistently objected to a rule while it was in 
the process of crystallizing. Bradley and Gulati propose to give states a limited
right to withdraw from some rules of customary international law after they 
have crystallized. This Section examines some of the respects in which Bradley 
and Gulati cabin their proposal and additional limitations that would appear to 
be implicit in their proposal. This examination shows that the authors’
proposal, though highly uncertain in its scope, is likely applicable to only a 
small subset of customary international law.
1. Procedural Limitations
Bradley and Gulati propose that states be granted the right to withdraw 
unilaterally from norms of customary international law, but only 
prospectively.4 States would remain bound by customary international law 
rules until they have provided public notice of their intent not to be bound, and 
they would remain responsible for violations that occurred before their 
repudiation of the norm.5 As Bradley and Gulati recognize, without this 
restriction, allowing withdrawal from customary norms would deny such 
3. Id. at 208, 275.
4. Id. at 258.
5. Id.
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norms any legal effect.6 The limitation is also supported by the analogy 
between treaties and custom that drives the authors’ proposal, as general 
international law permits only prospective withdrawal from treaties.7
In addition, Bradley and Gulati are open to a requirement of reasonable 
notice, which would delay the effect of a repudiation of a customary norm until 
the expiration of an unspecified but “reasonable” period of time.8 This 
limitation is likewise supported by the analogy to treaties. Where a right to 
withdraw from a treaty exists by inference, the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT) provides for a notice period of twelve months.9 Although 
the authors do not commit to a notice requirement,10 for reasons discussed 
below, this requirement is essential.
2. Substantive Limitations
Bradley and Gulati recognize that a right to withdraw may not be 
appropriate for all customary norms.11 In fact, after considering potential 
objections to their proposal, the authors carefully limit their claim to the 
proposition that the Mandatory View is not appropriate for all norms of 
customary international law.12 They recognize the need to develop a typology 
of norms, distinguishing those for which withdrawal rights are appropriate 
from the rest.13 This Subsection considers some substantive limitations that the 
authors address and some that they do not consider but seem implicit in their 
argument.
First, Bradley and Gulati recognize that some human rights norms should 
not be subject to unilateral withdrawal. They accept this exception because of 
agency concerns,14 although, as discussed below, there are additional 
justifications for excluding these norms from any right of withdrawal. 
6. In responding to the argument that the Default View deprives norms of legal effect, the 
authors point to the fact that states would be responsible for violations occurring before they 
withdrew. Id. at 258-59.
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 70, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 349 
[hereinafter VCLT].
8. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 258-59.
9. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 56(2), at 345.
10. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 259.
11. Id. at 273.
12. Id. at 254.
13. Id. at 273.
14. Id.
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Although the authors do not specify which human rights norms should be 
exempt from withdrawal, scholars sympathetic to their proposal have argued 
that the exception should extend to all customary norms that “recognize[] 
private actors as rights holders or third party beneficiaries of international 
obligations, including in areas as diverse as humanitarian law, protection of 
aliens, and preservation of the environment.”15 If so, the exception would apply 
to norms not traditionally regarded as human rights norms.
The authors’ analysis supports an additional exception for norms not 
grounded on state consent. In their article, Bradley and Gulati allude to a 
conceptual link between the consent-based character of international law and 
the proposed right of unilateral withdrawal.16 The authors rightly do not claim 
that the consent-based character of international law requires a right of 
unilateral withdrawal.17 But the right of withdrawal would seem to depend on
the consent-based character of its rules. If so, then the right of withdrawal 
cannot extend to norms that apply without regard to consent. This may be an 
additional reason for exempting some human rights norms from the right of 
withdrawal,18 as it is widely believed, though contested, that some nontreaty 
human rights norms are not grounded on state consent.19 This exception might
also cover some non-human-rights norms, such as structural or background 
principles that, despite not being treaty-based, the authors agree are “‘not 
“customary law” in any meaningful sense.’”20
15. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Custom: Analogies to Treaty Withdrawals, 21 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 65, 73 (2010).
16. See, e.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 205 (noting that “if the persistent objector 
doctrine is needed in order to ensure that [customary international law] is consensual,” it is 
unclear why a right of unilateral withdrawal is not also necessary).
17. The consent-based character of customary international law is not incompatible with an 
approach whereby the states’ consent is inferred from their silence during the period of a 
norm’s formation. Nor is it incompatible with a prohibition of prospective unilateral 
withdrawal: if a prohibition of such withdrawal is itself an accepted rule of international 
law, then by remaining silent during a rule’s formation, the state consents to be bound by 
such a rule until the rule dissolves or is superseded by another rule formed in the same way.
18. The authors seem to gesture toward this conclusion when they cite the strength of the moral 
considerations in human rights law as a reason for exempting such law from the right of 
withdrawal. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 267.
19. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 
38 (1995/96).
20. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 274 (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
POLITICS AND VALUES 32 (1995)). Presumably, the authors do not regard these norms as 
customary in a meaningful sense because they are not based on state consent.
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Bradley and Gulati also seem to accept that a right of withdrawal may not 
be appropriate for norms whose violation would produce significant 
externalities.21 Their primary response to the objection that unilateral 
withdrawal could produce such externalities is to note that problems 
implicating significant externalities are unlikely to be resolvable through 
customary rules.22 This seems like a backhanded concession that a right to 
withdraw in such contexts would gut the underlying rule. The authors note 
that “[t]he problem of externalities helps explain why some treaty regimes 
explicitly or implicitly restrict withdrawal.”23 It may or may not be true that 
custom is less likely to be useful than treaties to address situations implicating 
the problem of externalities, but the authors’ analysis suggests that customary 
norms that do emerge to address such situations should not be subject to 
withdrawal.
It would also make sense to prohibit unilateral withdrawal from customary 
rules that have value to states only if all or most other states adhere to them. 
(Bradley and Gulati do not explicitly address this category, but it would appear 
to overlap with the one just considered.) A rational choice analysis suggests 
that states will be willing to accept a rule when, over the long term, they expect 
to gain more from other states’ adherence to the rule than from their own 
deviations from it. Much of international law—or at least that subset of it that 
is consent-based—consists of norms to which states are willing to adhere for 
precisely this reason. Some such rules might be of value to states even if only 
some other states adhere to them. The immunity rules that the authors use to 
illustrate their thesis might fall in this category. A state may find it of value to 
exempt officials of particular countries from arrest if those countries 
reciprocally exempt its officials from arrest, regardless of how many other 
states adhere to the rule. Such rules might plausibly be conceptualized as a web 
of bilateral arrangements. Other rules, however, might have value to individual 
states only if all or most states adhere to them. An example would be a rule 
limiting the killing of an endangered species of fish. Withdrawal from such a 
rule by a small number of states would deprive the rule of value for all states. It 
would accordingly make sense to exclude rules of this type from the right of 
unilateral withdrawal.
A final category of substantive limitation seems implicit in the very concept 
of a right of withdrawal. The terms “withdrawal” and “opting out” suggest 
that the authors are arguing that a state may unilaterally move from a state of 
21. Id. at 263-66.
22. Id. at 264-66.
23. Id. at 266.
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being bound by a norm vis-à-vis other states (with other states being bound 
vis-à-vis it) to a state of not being bound, but not in the other direction. Thus, 
Bradley and Gulati would permit a state to withdraw from a rule exempting 
diplomatic pouches from search, freeing itself to search other nations’ pouches 
and freeing other nations to search its pouches,24 but presumably they would 
not permit states to “withdraw” from a rule permitting the search of diplomatic 
pouches, leaving such pouches immune from search.25 This is presumably 
because they would regard an immunity from search as a restraint on state 
freedom, whereas they would regard an absence of immunity as a 
manifestation of state freedom. Their argument seems to be that states should 
be able unilaterally to increase state freedom but not decrease it.
The authors’ analysis thus appears to assume a default rule of state freedom 
similar to that which the Permanent Court of International Justice described in 
the famous Lotus case.26 Some scholars would dispute this background 
assumption as incoherent or unreflective of modern international law.27 In my 
view, the assumption is plausible, but only if understood in a particular way. 
Specifically, the author cannot be arguing that states should be able to 
withdraw all the way to a state of nature. In a state of nature, states would have 
the power to search diplomatic pouches within their territory, but they would 
also be able to take retaliatory action against states that searched their pouches, 
such as invading the searching state. If the authors are arguing that the 
withdrawing state has a right to search pouches within its territory, they must 
be rejecting the freedom of states to retaliate against states that search pouches. 
In a state of nature, legal rights do not exist. Thus, if the authors are 
advocating a legal right to withdraw from custom, their argument must 
presuppose some basic legal limits on state behavior from which states cannot 
withdraw. Without certain fundamental legal restrictions on state conduct, the 
very concept of a “right to withdraw” from certain rules would be 
unintelligible.
24. Id. at 255-56, 260-61.
25. A state could unilaterally commit not to search other states’ pouches, but it could not 
unilaterally render its own pouches immune from search.
26. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 19 (Sept. 7); see also Bradley & 
Gulati, supra note 2, at 272 (discussing the Lotus case).
27. See, e.g., Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, 2010 I.C.J. 141, declaration of Judge Simma, slip op. at 1, ¶ 3 (July 22, 
2010), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15993.pdf (“[B]y upholding the 
Lotus principle, the Court fails to seize a chance to move beyond this anachronistic, 
extremely consensualist vision of international law.”).
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Thus, the concept of state freedom implicit in the concept of “withdrawal”
must assume the existence of such basic norms of international law as the 
prohibition of the use of force against the territorial integrity of another state in 
the absence of a permissive rule to the contrary and the related obligation of a 
state not to exercise police power in the territory of another state without the 
consent of the second state.28 Bradley and Gulati seem to accept some such 
limitation when they write that “[i]t probably . . . makes sense to treat certain 
structural or background principles as mandatory.”29 As examples, they give 
the concept of pacta sunt servanda and the concept of the nation-state.30 I would 
add to the list (in addition to the norms mentioned above) the concept of 
sovereign equality of nations. Exclusion of such rules from the right of 
withdrawal seems implicit in the very concept of right of withdrawal.31
The foregoing are just some of the categories of norms that would not be 
subject to the right of unilateral withdrawal proposed by Bradley and Gulati.32
While the authors insist that the prevailing approach is unjustified insofar as it 
prohibits prospective unilateral withdrawal from any norms of customary 
international law, they tell us very little about which norms would be subject to 
withdrawal and which would not be. Further reflection may well lead the 
authors to conclude that the list of norms subject to withdrawal, based on their 
own assumptions and analysis, is quite short.
28. Without the latter rule, a state would be able to search diplomatic pouches outside its
territory, something that the authors do not advocate.
29. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 274.
30. Id.
31. An exception for the rules concerning jurisdiction and the use of force may also follow from 
the authors’ concern about externalities. See id. at 266 (suggesting that “since intrusion on a 
nation’s territory has long been viewed as a justification for war, the externalities associated 
with unilateral withdrawal are high,” and thus boundary treaties are presumed not to be 
subject to unilateral withdrawal). As the discussion in the text shows, the rationales for 
excluding norms from any right of unilateral withdrawal often overlap.
32. Yet another candidate for exemption from the right to withdraw would be rules of 
customary international law that satisfy the traditional requirements of norm formation 
under international law. The authors defend the Default View in part as a response to the 
recent loosening of these requirements, and they appear to recognize that their argument for 
a right to withdraw would be weaker in the absence of these developments. Id. at 242-45. 
Many norms of customary international law predate these developments or would be 
recognized even under more traditional approaches to norm formation. The authors’
analysis would support an exclusion of such norms from the proposed right of unilateral 
withdrawal.
terrible food, small portions
277
B. The Limitations of the Mandatory View
Certain features of the Mandatory View, as it actually operates, reveal it to 
be closer to the Default View than Bradley and Gulati suggest. I do not refer to 
the aspects of customary international law, such as its indeterminacy, that 
enable states to disguise their breaches of such law. The authors rightly note 
that this argument for retaining the Mandatory View is in tension with rule-of-
law values.33 I refer instead to certain formal or quasi-formal features of the 
prevailing regime that limit the negative consequences of a state’s open 
repudiation of an existing norm of customary international law. For the 
reasons discussed here, the problems that the authors ascribe to the Mandatory 
View are not as severe as they suggest, and the corresponding benefits of
adopting the Default View are not as significant.
1. The Quasi-Legitimacy of Open Repudiations
As Bradley and Gulati acknowledge, current international law recognizes 
that customary international law evolves through states’ violation of existing 
norms.34 Thus, paradoxically, a state’s open violation of an existing norm, if 
framed as a proposal for a change in the law, is simultaneously an (illegitimate) 
violation of an existing norm and a (legitimate) step towards the creation of a 
new norm. An open repudiation of an existing norm thus has a dual effect, 
producing far less stigma for the repudiating state than would a naked 
violation of the norm.
Bradley and Gulati note that open repudiations do not convey a clear signal 
that the violating state is a bad actor.35 They argue that the Default View is 
preferable because it would permit other states to distinguish more clearly 
between good and bad actors.36 This argument seems overstated. Under both 
the Default View and the Mandatory View, a state’s naked violation of a norm 
will reveal it to be a bad actor. Under the Mandatory View, the open 
repudiation of a norm, if framed as a proposal for a change in the law, would 
initially convey an ambiguous signal. If a sufficient number of other states were 
to join in the repudiation, the violation would be retroactively validated. If the 
requisite number of states do not follow suit within a reasonable time, the 
repudiating state’s continued violation of the norm would reveal it to be a bad 
33. Id. at 261-62.
34. Id. at 212.
35. Id. at 260.
36. Id. at 259.
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actor. Under the Default View, a repudiation framed as a withdrawal would be 
formally valid from the start, but Bradley and Gulati acknowledge that such 
withdrawals would nevertheless sometimes be perceived by other states as 
uncooperative moves and hence would have negative reputational 
consequences.37 (For this reason, they argue, norms will continue to be sticky 
even under the Default View.38) If so, adoption of the Default View would not 
bring appreciably more clarity to the actions of states that openly repudiate 
existing norms. In any event, the dual effect of an open repudiation would 
mean that, in the short term, the effect of a state’s open repudiation of an 
existing norm under the Default View would not be dramatically different from 
its effect under the Mandatory View.
In the medium term, there would be an important difference: the Default 
View would always validate the repudiation, while the Mandatory View would 
validate it only if a sufficient number of other states followed suit. In other 
words, the Mandatory View requires the repudiating state to fall into line if its 
proposal for a change in the law has not borne fruit. A state’s failure to do so 
would reveal it to be a bad actor. But the clarity that such a rule would bring to 
the signal sent by a state’s repudiation in the medium term is hardly a strong 
reason for adopting the Default View. The authors’ proposal largely reduces 
itself to the claim that states should be able to continue to deviate even if most 
other states would prefer to retain the rule.39 That conclusion should stand or 
37. Id. at 248.
38. Id.
39. In one respect, the authors’ proposal is potentially more restrictive than the prevailing 
approach. The authors are open to the requirement of a notice period, before the expiration 
of which no withdrawal would be permitted. Under the prevailing approach, a state’s open 
repudiation of a norm, if framed as the proposal of a new norm, would produce minimal 
stigma in the short term even without a notice period. The reasons for a notice period 
suggest that such a period should be required for open repudiations even under the 
Mandatory View. The imposition of a notice period might be awkward because an open 
repudiation is technically a violation of the law under the Mandatory View. But 
international law frequently regulates conduct that is illegal. Jus in bello, as a class, falls in 
this category insofar as it regulates the conduct of wars that may themselves be illegal.
If a notice period were adopted for open repudiations under the Mandatory View, and 
if that period were equivalent in length to the period of time accorded to the repudiating 
state to convince other states to follow the repudiating state’s lead, after which continued 
violation would be regarded as unreasonable, then the resulting regime would be one in 
which the repudiating state would be required to comply with the rule unless and until a 
sufficient number of other states “accept” their proposal for a change in the law. Deviation 
from the norm would be allowed only when and if the norm loses its legal force. This 
change in the mandatory regime would have the benefit of regularizing the process for 
establishing new customary norms, eliminating the “dual effect” paradox. It is supported by 
the authors’ argument for requiring a notice period for unilateral withdrawals, and it should 
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fall on its merits. If states conclude that other states should not be able to 
continue to deviate in such circumstances, then continued deviation should be 
regarded as a bad act.
2. The Less Demanding Requirements for Unmaking Norms
As noted, under the Mandatory View, a state will be bound by a rule of 
customary international law as long as the rule retains its legal force, and the 
rule will retain its legal force until a sufficient number of states join in 
repudiating the norm. But the Mandatory View’s requirement that the 
repudiating state convince a sufficient number of other states to follow suit is 
less onerous than Bradley and Gulati suggest. The authors argue that the 
Mandatory View gives excessive power to one or two holdout states, which can 
unilaterally prevent a new norm from forming.40 But, as the authors elsewhere 
recognize, a new norm can form even over the dissent of one or two states.41
Indeed, as the authors explain, the persistent objector doctrine developed 
precisely to facilitate the emergence of new norms over the dissent of a few 
states.42 A single state, or even a few, would not be able to hold up the others; 
rather, they would be regarded as persistent objectors.
In any event, escaping from an existing rule of customary international law 
does not necessarily require the creation of a new rule of customary 
international law; it merely requires the dissolution of the existing rule.43
Because the unmaking of a customary rule requires the agreement of fewer 
states than its making, even a large number of states would not be able to 
prevent a rule of customary international law from dissolving.44 To use a 
stylized example, assume that the formation of a rule of customary 
international law requires the agreement (either express or tacit) of a minimum 
be considered in this parallel context even if the right of withdrawal were itself rejected, as 
this Essay argues it should be.
40. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 249-50.
41. Id. at 234 (discussing current acceptance of the persistent objector doctrine).
42. Id.
43. Cf. id. at 249-50. This passage, particularly note 202, appears to assume that the only way to 
escape from an existing rule is to succeed in creating a new one.
44. The distinction between making (or extending) a rule and unmaking one is parallel to the 
distinction drawn above between a change in the law that reduces state freedom and a 
change that enhances state freedom. The distinction is thus subject to the objections and 
qualifications discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31. The premise of the 
argument in the text would undoubtedly be challenged by some, but, as discussed above, 
the authors’ argument for a right to withdraw seems to depend on acceptance of it.
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of 80% of the world’s states. Thus, if 95% of states are in accord with a given 
norm, the norm exists and binds the 95% of states that accept it, the remaining 
5% being persistent objectors not subject to the norm. An attempt to extend the 
norm would require the agreement of 80% of states. But an attempt to loosen 
the norm, making it less restrictive of state freedom, would require the 
agreement of only enough states to bring the number of states accepting the 
norm below the 80% threshold. Of course, the requirements for making and 
unmaking norms of customary international law are far more complex and 
contested than in this highly stylized example, but the complexities do not 
negate the basic point that it takes significantly less state practice and opinio 
juris to unmake a norm than to make or extend one.45
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then the problem with the prevailing 
regime is not that it permits a few states to hold up the states that seek a 
change in the law but rather that it empowers a minority of states to dissolve 
an existing rule of customary international law for all states. But the same 
would be true even under the Default View. Adoption of the Default View 
could perhaps be coupled with a modification of the prevailing approach for 
unmaking rules of customary international law, so that such rules would 
remain in place for nonwithdrawing states even if they comprised less than 
80% of all states. This would indeed be an appealing change, and it is perhaps 
the strongest argument for the Default View. But this would not be a radical 
change from current practice, as, even under the Mandatory View, a minority 
or small majority of states that continue to support the rule are free to agree to 
it by treaty or, under certain circumstances, to retain it as regional custom.46
3. The Limited Responsibility Attending a State’s Repudiation of (Some) 
Existing Norms
There is yet another respect in which the Mandatory View is less 
mandatory than it at first appears. If a repudiating state does not succeed at 
disestablishing the norm and yet refuses after a reasonable period of time to 
comply with it, the secondary rules of international law will in many cases 
significantly limit the extent of that state’s responsibility. Consider the 
customary international law rule regarding the immunity of heads of state. 
Formally, states cannot opt out of this rule, even prospectively. But, if State A
45. See MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 55 (2d ed. 1997);
Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECEUIL 
DES COURS 1, 21 (1978).
46. See VILLIGER, supra note 45, at 55.
terrible food, small portions
281
announces that it will no longer adhere to the rule, what is the result under the 
secondary rules of international law? First, of course, State A’s head of state 
will be subject to arrest and prosecution in other states if he commits a crime, 
and he will be subject to suit on civil claims. (Reciprocal noncompliance is an 
uncontroversial countermeasure.47) Second, because other states are on notice 
that State A may arrest their heads of state, they will likely refrain from sending 
their heads of state to State A.
If State B does send its head of state to State A and State A subjects her to 
criminal prosecution or civil suit, State B would likely be entitled to limited 
compensation, if any. According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), “it 
would follow [from the duty to mitigate] that an injured state which has failed 
to take the necessary measures to limit the damage sustained would not be 
entitled to claim compensation for that damage which could have been 
avoided.”48 To be sure, as the ICJ went on to note, “[w]hile this principle 
might thus provide a basis for the calculation of damages, it could not . . .
justify an otherwise wrongful act.”49 Because State A’s violation of the rule 
would be wrongful under the Mandatory View notwithstanding State B’s 
failure to mitigate, State A would be under an obligation to cease the 
violation,50 and a tribunal with jurisdiction could order the release of the head 
of state. But presumably State A’s repudiation of head-of-state immunity 
would be accompanied by its exclusion of such cases from any existing consent 
to jurisdiction.51 State B could impose countermeasures, but they must be 
proportional.52 Presumably, the injured state’s failure to mitigate would be 
relevant to the proportionality calculus. In sum, even though State A’s 
withdrawal from the norm of customary international law would be wrongful, 
the secondary rules of international law accord a significant degree of legal 
47. See U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, art. 48, commentary ¶ 5, in Rep. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, A/56/20, at 126-27 (2001) [hereinafter ILC 
Draft Articles and Commentary].
48. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 55 (Sept. 25); see ILC 
Draft Articles and Commentary, supra note 47, art. 31, at 93.
49. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 55.
50. See ILC Draft Articles and Commentary, supra note 47, art. 30, at 88.
51. If the U.S. withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations is any indication, such a withdrawal would be accepted even if the initial consent 
to jurisdiction did not reserve a right of withdrawal. Depositary Notification, U.N. 
Secretary-General, United States of America: Notification of Withdrawal, U.N. Doc. 
CN.186.2005.TREATIES-1 (Mar. 11, 2005).
52. ILC Draft Articles and Commentary, supra note 47, art. 22, at 76.
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effectiveness to State A’s wrongful act.53 There is, in other words, a gap 
between the primary rules of international law, which prohibit unilateral 
withdrawal, and the remedial rules, which limit or deny remedies for (some) 
such withdrawals.
The secondary rules of international law may not reduce the repudiating 
state’s international responsibility with respect to all rules of customary 
international law.54 For example, if State A were to announce that it will no 
longer recognize the norm of customary international law forbidding states 
from exercising police power on the territory of other states without their 
consent, there would be little that other states could do in advance to mitigate 
damages. If State A acts in contravention of that norm by sending its police 
across the border to arrest a citizen of State B, State B would be entitled to full 
reparations.55 But, for a variety of reasons, this is likely a norm that would not 
be subject to withdrawal even if the Default View were adopted. First, an 
abduction of the sort posited may well violate human rights norms56 and 
would in any event fall within the possible exemption for norms as to which 
individuals are third party beneficiaries.57 More importantly, the rule 
prohibiting the extraterritorial exercise of police power is an instantiation of 
the principle that states have exclusive and plenary jurisdiction over their 
territory in the absence of an accepted limitation of that power, a principle that, 
as discussed above, would likely not be subject to withdrawal even under the 
53. The possible result—the head of state’s continued detention—may seem harsh, but it bears 
noting that the head of state may be detained only according to laws that satisfy 
international human rights standards. Thus, she can be detained pursuant to criminal 
prosecution, and her continued detention would be subject to conviction of a crime 
according to procedures that satisfy due process. International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, arts. 7, 9-11, 14-15, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 175-77. As the authors recognize, withdrawal from human rights provisions 
would likely be impermissible even if the Default View were adopted.
54. I am indebted to Anthea Roberts for suggesting the counterarguments discussed in this 
paragraph and the next.
55. State B could not, however, respond by sending police into State A to arrest fugitives there, 
as the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility specifies that countermeasures may not 
include violations of “the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations.” ILC Draft Articles and Commentary, supra note 47, art. 
50(1)(a), at 131. For reasons discussed above, this would almost certainly be a rule from 
which withdrawal would not be permissible.
56. Öcalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 133.
57. See Helfer, supra note 15, at 73. As to whether individuals are third-party beneficiaries of the 
rule prohibiting one nation to exercise police power on the territory of another state without 
the territorial state’s consent, see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies 
of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1137-41 (1992).
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Default View. Indeed, the posited act would appear to be a small-scale violation 
of the norm barring the use of force against the territorial integrity of other 
states, a norm that is embodied in a treaty58 that itself may not be subject to 
withdrawal59 and is indeed regarded as having the status of jus cogens.60
On the other hand, if we were to change the hypothetical to one involving 
the customary law rules regarding jurisdiction to prescribe (which may be 
subject to withdrawal under the authors’ theory), the mitigation principles 
discussed above would reduce the repudiating state’s international 
responsibility. Assume that State A announces that it will no longer adhere to 
the customary limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe and, accordingly, makes 
it a violation of its law for anyone anywhere in the world to chew gum. 
While State A’s enforcement of this law would violate customary international 
law, State A would not be able to enforce this law against persons not 
present in State A or possessing property there except by violating the 
customary international law rules prohibiting the exercise of police power on 
the territory of other states without the consent of the territorial state (rules 
that are not subject to withdrawal). In light of the latter limitations, a gum 
chewer could not be arrested by State A outside of State A’s territory, and his 
property outside of State A could not be seized by State A to recover a 
judgment against him. If the gum chewer were to enter the territory of State A
or keep his property there after State A had announced its repudiation of the 
norm in question, presumably he would be deemed to have failed to mitigate, a 
failure that would presumably be attributable to his state and thus vitiate or at 
least reduce its entitlement to reparations. To be sure, the gum chewer’s failure 
to mitigate does not justify State A’s violation of the limitations on prescriptive 
jurisdiction, so its exorbitant exercise of jurisdiction would remain wrongful. 
But the secondary rules of international law would accord a significant degree 
of legal effectiveness to State A’s wrongful act.
Insofar as the existing secondary rules of international law would reduce or 
vitiate an injured state’s entitlement to reparations from the repudiating state, 
the Mandatory View, as it actually operates, differs less from the Default View 
than Bradley and Gulati suggest. Because the authors do not tell us which 
norms would be subject to withdrawal under the Default View, it is uncertain 
how many norms would both (a) be subject to withdrawal and (b) result in 
58. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4.
59. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 274 (“Perhaps . . . systemic arguments can be made for 
restricting exit from foundational organizations such as the United Nations.”).
60. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, 100-01, ¶ 190 (June 27); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 615, ¶ 88 (Nov. 26) (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
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reduced international responsibility of the repudiating state for the reasons 
discussed above. The norms that the authors use as the principal examples of 
the Default View in action (those involving immunity) appear to fall within 
this set. In the end, there may be very few norms that would be subject to 
withdrawal yet whose violation would not result in diminished international 
responsibility as a result of the repudiation.
In sum, the difference between the Default View and the Mandatory View, 
as it actually operates, is not as stark as Bradley and Gulati suggest. Under the 
Default View, states would be able to withdraw unilaterally from a limited but 
unspecified set of norms of customary international law, but only 
prospectively, and subject to a notice period of unspecified length. Under the 
Mandatory View, a state’s repudiation and violation of an existing norm would 
formally be a wrongful act, but, because international law recognizes that 
custom often develops through violations of existing rules, a repudiation 
framed as a proposal of a new rule would not generate significant stigma for 
the repudiating state in the short term. In the longer term, the violation would 
be retroactively validated if a sufficient number of other states joined in 
repudiating the norm, but a smaller number than the authors appear to believe. 
Only if the requisite number of states do not follow suit within a reasonable 
period of time would the repudiating state’s continued violation of the rule be 
an unadulterated breach of its international obligations. Even then, the 
secondary rules of international law would often disentitle an injured state to 
much in the way of reparations for the breach.
The principal doctrinal change that adoption of the Default View would 
produce concerns the requirement that the repudiating state obtain the 
agreement of a certain number of other states to unmake a norm (likely far less 
than a majority). Under the Mandatory View, such agreement among a 
minority of states would result in the dissolution of the norm for all states 
rather than just for the repudiating state. Under the Default View a repudiating 
state would be exempt from the norm even without the agreement of other 
states, but the remaining states would remain subject to the norm. Adoption of 
the Default View might facilitate a shift towards a regime in which norms 
would remain in force for nonwithdrawing states even after a significant 
minority or small majority of states have repudiated the norm. The latter end
result would in some respects be desirable. Nevertheless, as the next Part will 
explain, the Default View would weaken customary international law and 
should be rejected by states that value it.
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ii . terrible food
Bradley and Gulati disclaim any hostility towards customary international 
law.61 Indeed, they argue that adoption of the Default View would strengthen 
it.62 This Part explains how adoption of the Default View would instead 
weaken customary international law, making it far less useful to states as a 
mechanism for addressing common problems. Presumably, states have 
refrained from advancing the Default View until now because they value 
customary international law and recognize that the Mandatory View is essential 
to its efficacy (such as it is). They are right to have done so.
The authors devote much of their article to arguing that the Mandatory 
View lacks a lengthy historical pedigree.63 The absence of such a pedigree, 
however, is a weak basis for rejecting a view that is accepted today. There is 
much about the international law of Vattel’s time that we do not accept today. 
Bradley and Gulati argue that this history shows that the Mandatory View is 
not the only conceivable or practicable approach to this issue.64 As David 
Luban and William Dodge have shown, however, even in its heyday, the 
Default View applied at best to a very limited range of norms.65 Moreover, the 
community of nations during this period looked very different than it does 
now. A regime that may have been workable for a world of very few states 
might well be unworkable for a world of many more states. In a world of 
numerous states, the Default View raises the prospect that the regime of 
customary international law would degenerate into an unfathomably complex 
patchwork of essentially bilateral legal relationships.
To be sure, treaty relationships sometimes degenerate into complex 
patchworks, not just because treaties sometimes permit withdrawal, but also 
because many also permit reservations. The authors’ proposal is, indeed, 
largely driven by a comparison of the law of treaties with that of customary 
international law, and they parry many objections to their proposal by noting 
that treaties often permit withdrawal and the sky has not fallen.66 It is true that 
61. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 208.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 215-40.
64. Id. at 241.
65. William S. Dodge, Withdrawing from International Law: Some Lessons from History, 120 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 169, 170 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/12/17/dodge.html; David 
Luban, Opting Out of the Law of War: Comments on Withdrawing from International 
Custom, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 151, 151 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/12/8/
luban.html.
66. See, e.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 246.
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many treaties permit unilateral withdrawal.67 But, as discussed below, there are 
important differences between treaties and custom that justify a flat rule 
prohibiting unilateral withdrawal from norms of customary international law.
A. Indeterminacy and Complexity
For a system of unwritten rules without centralized enforcement or 
adjudication, the clarity and simplicity of the systems’ rules are important to 
their efficacy. “Enforcement” of customary international law is decentralized, 
consisting largely of each state monitoring the behavior of other states and 
identifying violations so that violators can be exposed as bad actors. The less
determinate the system’s norms, the greater the opportunities for evasion or 
contestation and the greater the difficulty of identifying violations. The greater 
the complexity of the system’s norms, or of the system of norms as a whole, the 
greater the resources that states must devote to monitoring behavior and 
exposing violations. For these and other reasons, simplicity and clarity are 
rightly regarded as important determinants of the “compliance pull” of 
international norms.68
It is true that all of the foregoing problems potentially afflict treaties, which 
nevertheless often permit withdrawal. But states negotiating treaties have the 
opportunity to address the problems. They can articulate their respective 
obligations in clear and determinate language. If they are unable to agree to 
clear language, they can set up an institution to give greater precision to the 
obligations, or a tribunal to resolve treaty ambiguities. If they agree to complex 
norms, they can establish and fund an institution to provide central and 
efficient enforcement. If they are unable to agree to any such mechanism, they 
can either give up on the treaty or resign themselves to a weak agreement. 
67. As Lea Brilmayer and Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet note, however, the background rule 
regarding withdrawal from treaties is not as dissimilar to the Mandatory View as the 
authors suggest. Lea Brilmayer & Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet, Treaty Denunciation and 
“Withdrawal” from Customary International Law: An Erroneous Analogy with Dangerous 
Consequences, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 217 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/1/5/brilmayer-
tesfalidet.html; see also Anthea Roberts, Who Killed Article 38(1)(b): A Reply to Bradley and 
Gulati, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 173, 179 (2010). Unilateral withdrawal from treaties is 
permitted only if there is evidence that the parties intended to permit withdrawal. In the 
absence of a provision addressing withdrawal, withdrawal is permitted only if an intent to 
permit withdrawal is inferable from the context. VCLT, supra note 7, arts. 54, 56(1), at 344-
45. The authors’ call for a typology of norms based on whether a right of withdrawal should 
exist might be understood as a call for the identification of norms as to which a right to 
withdraw would make sense and would thus have been favored by states had they 
considered the issue.
68. See THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 50-90 (1990).
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Since customary international law lacks all of these options,69 if states do not 
compensate with relatively clear and simple norms, they will be left with a 
system as inefficacious as the least efficacious treaty.
As Bradley and Gulati recognize, customary international law already fares 
poorly on the determinacy scale.70 Adoption of the Default View would make 
this bad situation worse. First, as discussed in Part I, the proposal as it stands is 
indeterminate in almost all of its key elements. It is unclear which norms are 
subject to unilateral withdrawal and under what circumstances. The default 
notice period that the authors suggest—“reasonable” notice71—is itself 
indeterminate, providing ample opportunities for contestation.
These deficiencies might perhaps be ascribed to the preliminary nature of 
the proposal. Perhaps, over time, the uncertainties could be eliminated through 
state practice. As one state purports to withdraw from one particular norm, the 
reactions of other states will eventually clarify whether withdrawal from that 
norm is permissible. State practice might even coalesce around a determinate 
period of notice for withdrawal from each particular norm. If this were 
regarded as a reasonable possibility, the question for states would be whether 
the costs imposed by the proposal’s indeterminacy during the transition period 
would be worth the expected long-term benefit.
In answering the latter question, account would have to be taken of the 
problems that would result from the complexity of the web of obligations that 
would result if the Default View were adopted. Even if the indeterminacies 
could be eliminated, the resulting system would be considerably more complex 
than under the Mandatory View. When one or more states withdraw from a 
norm, the legal rights and obligations of the remaining states vis-à-vis the 
withdrawing states will of course differ from their rights and obligations vis-à-
vis nonwithdrawing states. If the authors’ theory commits them to accepting 
partial withdrawals, then the possibility exists of numerous distinct levels of 
obligation among states with respect to the same issue. For example, some 
states might accept an obligation of prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation, while other states might accept an obligation of effective and 
adequate but not prompt compensation, and others an obligation of prompt 
69. The International Court of Justice is available to resolve disputes involving customary 
international law, but only for disputes between states that have submitted declarations 
under the Optional Clause agreeing to its compulsory jurisdiction in cases involving 
customary international law. As of December 14, 2010, sixty-six states had submitted (and 
not withdrawn) such declarations. Jurisdiction, I.C.J., http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3.
70. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 261.
71. Id. at 258-59.
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but not adequate or effective compensation, while yet other states accept no 
obligation to compensate at all.72 The resulting patchwork of obligations could 
be exceedingly complex, complicating significantly any monitoring of 
compliance and weakening the efficacy of the system accordingly.
Of course, the international community could create an institution to 
provide centralized and efficient enforcement, or a tribunal to resolve 
ambiguities in the norms. But a world with such an institution would be very 
different from the world we have. The lack of such an institution is a 
significant feature of modern customary international law and an important 
consideration in determining whether a right to withdraw would be 
appropriate for the customary international law of today. Given current 
conditions, the Default View would weaken customary international law in the 
short term, and probably in the long term as well, by introducing significant 
indeterminacies and complexities that would adversely affect the efficacy of its 
norms.
B. The Underinvestment Problem
A related, though distinct, problem with the Default View results from the 
uncertainty that it would introduce regarding how long other states would be 
bound by any given norm. A long-term perspective is crucial with respect to 
customary international law. A state acting rationally in its self-interest is likely 
to acquiesce in a customary norm only if it stands to gain more in the long term 
from other states’ compliance with the norm than it stands to lose from its own 
compliance with the norm. This is why it is sometimes rational for a state to 
subordinate its short-term self-interest in violating a norm. The subordination 
of its short-term self-interest is an investment that will pay off over the long 
term when other states similarly forego the short-term benefits of violating the 
norm. The indeterminacy of norms affects this calculus by facilitating the 
evasion of the norm, thus reducing the expected payoff for other states and 
72. As discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 24-31, the authors maintain that states 
can, through their unilateral declarations, move from a state of greater legal restraint to one 
of lesser legal restraint. It would follow that, if there were a rule prohibiting expropriation 
unless accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, the authors would 
permit states to withdraw from one, two, or all three requirements. Similarly, if current 
customary international law established an exclusive economic zone of 200 miles, cf. United 
Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, arts. 56-57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561 
(designating an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of two hundred miles for each state), then, 
assuming this were otherwise a rule from which withdrawal were permitted, states would be 
able to “withdraw” in favor of a zone of any length less than two hundred miles. Thus, 
potentially, there could be any number of different rules on this question.
terrible food, small portions
289
reducing every state’s incentive to make the initial investment in the first place. 
The Default View aggravates this problem by adding another layer of 
uncertainty—uncertainty about how long other nations will be bound. Bradley 
and Gulati recognize a potential underinvestment problem but argue that it 
would affect only a subset of customary norms.73 It seems to me that the 
underinvestment problem is pervasive and that consequently the Default View 
would weaken customary international law at its core.74
A notice period would alleviate this problem but not cure it. Requiring 
advance notice would force states facing an immediate temptation to violate the 
norm to take a long-term perspective in deciding whether to withdraw. This is 
why a notice period would be essential if the Default View were adopted. A 
notice period would delay any violations and might forestall some withdrawals 
by extending the time horizon of states contemplating withdrawal, but it 
would not remove the possibility that some other states will cease to be bound. 
For states that have been subordinating their self-interest for many years based 
on an expected gain over the long term from other states’ compliance, the exit 
of other states from the group of those bound by the norm would be a raw 
deal. It is no answer that the withdrawing state has itself been complying for 
the same period of time. It is possible that the withdrawing state has never 
faced a temptation to violate the rule. For example, a state that has adhered to a 
norm of diplomatic immunity may never have had a diplomat commit a 
significant crime within its territory. If, during that period, its own diplomats 
committed crimes for which they were not prosecuted by other states, then the 
state obtained the benefit of other states’ compliance with the norm without 
cost for years. The notice requirement prevents such a state from backing out 
of the norm the moment it faces its first temptation to violate the norm, but it 
still enables it to deprive other states of their expected benefit over the longer 
term.75
73. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 255.
74. The persistent objector doctrine does not present this problem because the persistent 
objector must make it known from the start that it will not be bound. Other states can thus 
take the nonparticipation of persistent objectors into account when calculating ex ante 
whether subordination of their short-term self-interest will be in their long-term self-
interest.
75. For this reason, if there were to be a general rule permitting prospective withdrawal from 
certain categories of norms, perhaps that rule should itself be applicable only to norms 
formed in the future. Even a purely prospective rule permitting prospective unilateral 
withdrawal would be problematic insofar as it would make states less likely to make the 
initial investment in compliance, but at least it would not cheat states that have been 
complying all along of their expected benefit.
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Acquiescing in a norm of customary international law is a form of 
precommitment, and so its value depends on the strength of the commitment it 
signals. Adding the option of unilateral withdrawal reduces the level of 
commitment that states would be signaling and thus diminishes the value of 
the norm to begin with. Because it would decrease the benefit that states could 
expect from compliance over the long term, the Default View would make it 
less likely that states would find it rational ex ante to make the investment 
represented by the subordination of their short-term interest in deviating from 
the norm. In this way, adoption of the Default View would make it more 
difficult for norms of customary international law to get off the ground in the 
first place.76
conclusion
The response of states to the proposal to add an option of unilateral 
withdrawal will be an accurate barometer of the value they place on customary 
international law. If the Default View would weaken the compliance pull of 
existing norms by multiplying indeterminacy and complexity and would 
reduce the value of such norms by diminishing the expected long-term payoff 
from compliance, then one would expect the proposal to be met with disfavor 
by states that value this form of precommitment. Since states control the 
formation of customary international law, presumably they would prefer to 
retain the option of having an effective regime of such law. If adding a 
withdrawal option significantly weakens the commitment represented by 
acceptance of a norm of customary international law, then it weakens the 
usefulness of this particular mechanism for advancing the mutual interests of 
states.
States have always had the ability to propose a shift to the Default View. 
Under the Mandatory View, they would do so by purporting to withdraw from 
a norm of customary international law, stating that in so doing they are seeking 
a change in the Mandatory View. Such a withdrawal would be technically a 
violation of the underlying norm, but in the short term the state’s action would 
76. It does not matter that the long-term costs to states of adhering to the norm are lower under 
the Default View if they know they can withdraw from it later. The relevant question is 
whether states will forego an immediate short-term benefit when they face a situation 
calling for application of the rule in order to enjoy the longer term benefits they expect to
derive from other states’ compliance with the rule. The knowledge that other states are able 
to withdraw from the rule unilaterally will reduce any given state’s expected long-term 
benefit from other states’ compliance. The fact that states will be able to withdraw from the 
rule themselves at a later point will not make them more likely to comply now.
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be regarded as quasi-legitimate. If other states agree, the Default View would 
be accepted with respect to the norm in question and the withdrawal would be 
validated retroactively. The fact that no state has initiated such a process may 
be due to their failure to have thought of it. More likely, it reflects their 
recognition of the dangers that would be posed to customary international law 
by allowing prospective unilateral withdrawal.
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